



**TID**

Tobacco Induced Diseases

## **Abstract Book**

# **17TH WORLD CONFERENCE ON TOBACCO OR HEALTH**

**7-9 MARCH 2018, CAPE TOWN, SOUTH AFRICA**

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Ministerial Resolution 425/2014 was sanctioned by the Minister. The availability of a legal resolution that assigned concrete roles to the parties involved led to the sanction of more than 300 citations and fines during 2014. This new proceeding generated a reaction in the tobacco industry that firstly asked for audiences with authorities of the Ministry of Health and then started to impugn the fines. There was a political will of continuing with the enforcement and none of the industry claims were heard. Since then, tobacco industry had to recur to ordinary justice that rejected their claims too. The start-up of this proceeding generated a change in the pattern of tobacco industry advertising that migrated from full-color billboards to the display of cigarette packs only at point of sales.

**Conclusions and key recommendations:** While advocates should fight for improving the law and a complete ban on advertising in Argentina is necessary to take advantage of the resources we already have and guarantee the enforcement of current law.

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**12:45-14:00**

### EP-112-2 Tobacco industry engaging agriculture ministers in Sri Lanka

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**Background:** In recent years, media reported joint activities of Ceylon Tobacco Company (CTC), the British American Tobacco (BAT) subsidiary holding cigarette manufacturing monopoly in Sri Lanka, and the Agriculture Ministers (Ministers). CTC is the only BAT subsidiary in the region that engages in a complete leaf to manufacture process in cigarette manufacturing. Tobacco needed in manufacturing was cultivated in Sri Lanka for the past decade. The Ministry of Agriculture is the government authority over agricultural activities and the Minister is the de facto decision maker on agricultural policy development and implementation. The study aimed to explore the engagement of Ministers of Agriculture in activities of CTC from 2000 onwards.

**Methods:** The study used a qualitative design on data obtained via participatory methods. Media reports and industry documents (reports, press releases and shareholder presentations) were identified using Ministers' names as key words. Photographs and other community level documentary evidence were obtained from the tobacco control activists via an open invitation. Data were analysed using a deductive content analysis on themes; government and political party, type of activity, the possible impact to the community and industry and extent and context of media coverage received.

**Results:** During the period, four individuals, all males, belonging to three political parties and four governments, served as Agriculture Ministers. All participated in activities organised by the CTC. All activities were under the label "Sustainable Agriculture Development Programme", the social investment initiative of CTC. The type of activities were visiting farmers, attending award ceremonies for farmers or their children and attending ceremonial openings of infrastructure developed under

CTC sponsorship. Most were conducted jointly with the Ministry or the local governments and all received positive media coverage.

**Conclusions:** Ceylon Tobacco used corporate social investment activities to engage Agriculture Ministers and the ministry, receiving wide positive media coverage in the process.

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**12:45-14:00**

### EP-113-2 Why do violations of FCTC Article 5.3 occur?: The case of tobacco industry incentives in Turkey

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**Background:** Aiming at eliminating tobacco industry interference, Article 5.3 forms the backbone of Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC). By way of analysis of investment and export incentives granted to tobacco industry in Turkey, this research intends to demonstrate that the task of realizing Article 5.3 provisions often entails political choice between conflicting legal frameworks of FCTC and neoliberal capitalism.

**Methods:** Data for incentives for tobacco manufacturing were compiled and analysed through keyword screening of lists of Investment Incentive Permits (IIP) for 2000-2016 and Inward and Outward Processing Permits (IPP and OPP) for 2015-2016 as published in the Official Gazette.

**Results:** Tobacco companies have received 30 IIPs, 39 IPPs and 2 OPPs in the periods researched. Granted pursuant to economic incentive regulations, but in stark contradiction to FCTC, and comprised of tax exemptions and financial aid, these incentives have increased over time, have been granted predominantly to transnational firms, creating vast new manufacturing capacities for cigarettes, waterpipe tobacco, and macarons (empty cigarette tubes). Production, consumption, and export figures have risen markedly in the same periods.

**Conclusions:** Incentives constitute a gross violation of FCTC Article 5.3, a key principle of which provides, "...the tobacco industry should not be granted incentives to establish or run their businesses". As the Turkish case shows, FCTC Article 5.3 may get violated and rendered completely obsolete, not necessarily because of political or bureaucratic weakness or inaptitude, but often on grounds of neoliberal policies and regulations. Political action is needed at national and international levels, to abolish tobacco industry incentives, strengthen effectiveness of FCTC implementation through supply-side measures which would allow Article 5.3 to take root, uphold FCTC as an overriding, powerful legal instrument, and operationalize and fortify its binding nature.

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## 2.5 Implementing sustainable funding mechanisms for tobacco control

**12:30-14:00**

### PS-577-2 Progress towards a health surcharge in Bangladesh

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